Investor Reactions To Complex Financial Accounting Disclosures: Experimental Evidence From The Tax Disclosure Of Permanently Reinvested Earnings by Feustel, Laura N.




Investor Reactions To Complex Financial
Accounting Disclosures: Experimental Evidence
From The Tax Disclosure Of Permanently
Reinvested Earnings
Laura N. Feustel
University of South Carolina
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Feustel, L. N.(2018). Investor Reactions To Complex Financial Accounting Disclosures: Experimental Evidence From The Tax Disclosure Of
Permanently Reinvested Earnings. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4625
INVESTOR REACTIONS TO COMPLEX FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING DISCLOSURES: 





Laura N. Feustel 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
Cedarville University, 2006 
 
Master of Business Administration 




Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 




Darla Moore School of Business 
 






Donna Bobek Schmitt, Major Professor 
 
Diana Falsetta, Committee Member 
 
Marlys Gascho Lipe, Committee Member 
 
Scott D. Vandervelde, Committee Member 
 
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
ii 




 I dedicate this work to my family. To my Mom and Dad, Lisa and Craig 
Shuneson: if not for your love and care I would never have had the opportunity to pursue 
my educational goals and developed the persistence needed to complete a doctoral 
program. The life lessons you taught me were far more valuable than anything I have 
ever learned in a classroom.  
To my little guys, Nolan and Preston: I hope one day you’ll think it is cool that 
your Mom got a PhD in Accounting. But, more than that, I hope one day that you will 
know that all the higher education you could ever get in the world is meaningless if you 
don’t know the One who made you, loves you, and died to save you. I love you! 
To my love, Doug: I know when you signed up to marry me you didn’t know this 
would be part of your story. But here we are, and we did it together! You moved to a new 
place, you supported me financially and emotionally, you prayed with and for me, and 
you were my biggest cheerleader. What an amazing partner you have been to me these 
last six years of marriage! This accomplishment belongs to us both. 
To my brother, siblings in-law, and in-laws: Thanks for all your support – the 
texts, flowers, Voxing, etc. has been a much needed encouragement. 
To my Riverside (and particularly, Elmwood) family: You guys have been such a 
blessing to our family during our time here. We will miss you all terribly!
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am deeply indebted to my committee members Donna Bobek Schmitt, Diana 
Falsetta, Marlys Lipe, and Scott Vandervelde. They have seen more drafts of this paper 
than I thought I would ever write! In particular, Donna has sacrificially given of her time 
to talk about dissertation ideas, read countless drafts, and challenge my thinking. I could 
not have done it without her guidance. Thanks also go out to Chelsea Rae Austin, Scott 
Jackson, Ethan LaMothe, Mary Marshall, Drew Newman, and workshop participants at 
the University of South Carolina, University of Mississippi, Baylor University, and the 
2017 Behavioral Tax Symposium. These tremendous colleagues have provided helpful 
feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Spenser Seifert who 
served as an independent data coder and Nick Frankle, my former colleague from public 
accounting, who provided the impetus to pursue this idea. 
v 
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates how increasing the transparency of complex financial 
accounting disclosures affects investor judgments. The income tax disclosure of 
permanently reinvested earnings is the context of this investigation as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is currently evaluating income tax disclosures and 
has specifically identified the disclosure of permanently reinvested earnings as an area to 
be reevaluated. Current standards allow corporations flexibility in their disclosures that 
can lead investors to be surprised by changes in a corporation’s assertions regarding the 
reinvestment of foreign earnings. My study suggests that increasing the transparency of 
complex disclosures through the explicit reporting of an economic value does not affect 
investor judgments. However, a change in the management assertion related to the 
realization of that value has a significant effect on investors’ judgments. My results 
demonstrate that standard setters should be mindful that management assertions may 
shape investors’ reactions to an equal or greater extent than the numerical disclosures in 
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This study investigates how nonprofessional investors react to increasing the 
transparency of complex financial accounting disclosures.1 As of 2013, 49 percent of all 
families held stock and by 2016, the equity securities held by households amounted to 
40.7 percent of the market (SIFMA 2017). In addition, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) specifically mentions individual (i.e., nonprofessional) 
investors in its Investor Advisory Committee charter as a group whose viewpoints they 
value (FASB 2016b). Specifically, it is important to understand the judgments of such a 
large, amateur financial statement user group related to complex financial information 
presented in the financial statements. While comment letters to FASB indicate that 
investors value increased transparency, nonprofessional investors may not have the skills 
and experience to make correct conclusions about the more transparent information 
provided. However, without increased transparency, investors may feel misled by the 
financial information they receive. Though this study examines the transparency tradeoff 
in regards to tax disclosures of permanently reinvested earnings, this same tradeoff could 
apply to many complex accounting areas, such as contingent liabilities, and fair value 
calculations.  
                                                          
1 Transparency is a broad term which can be operationalized in many different ways. When I use the phrase 
“increased transparency” in this paper, I am referring to the addition of an explicit disclosure of an 
economic value to a complex accounting disclosure.  
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Over the last few years, accounting standard setters and the news media have 
shown an interest in the reporting of permanently reinvested earnings (e.g., Gelles and de 
la Merced 2015, FASB 2016a). Permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) are earnings from 
a foreign subsidiary that a corporation plans to reinvest indefinitely in a foreign 
jurisdiction. These earnings are also referred to interchangeably as “untaxed foreign 
earnings,” “indefinitely reinvested earnings,” or “undistributed earnings.” The recent 
attention to PRE stems from the income tax consequences of these earnings. For foreign 
earnings that are temporarily reinvested, income taxes are accrued for financial 
accounting purposes in the period earned, although the taxes are not paid until the 
earnings are repatriated. However, for foreign earnings that are deemed permanently 
reinvested, no accrual for income taxes is necessary.2 Instead, ASC 740-30-50-2 requires 
corporations to disclose, but not record, the potential future tax liability unless 
management deems the tax liability impracticable to estimate, in which case no dollar 
value is disclosed.3  
The impact of PRE on investors can be significant. Investors have seen 
considerable PRE growth in large U.S. corporations over the last several years. For 
Fortune 500 companies, PRE have more than doubled in the last six years. In 2009, 
$1.125 trillion of PRE were held offshore, compared with $2.4 trillion at the end of 2015 
                                                          
2In this paper, I will use the term permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to refer to these earnings. In 
general, foreign earnings can be classified in three possible ways: as permanently reinvested, as temporarily 
reinvested, or as not reinvested (i.e., immediately repatriated to the U.S.).  
3 With the passage of the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act, the taxation of permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings (and foreign earnings in general) has undergone significant changes. However, the implications of 
this study to complex accounting disclosures overall are still relevant. This paper ignores these changes as 
very little guidance has been issued on the implementation and interaction of these new rules. Both the IRS 
and the FASB have plans to issue guidance related to the tax changes in the near future. Additionally, 
though the tax law has changed, it has not completely eliminated all tax deferrals or the method of 
disclosure for asserting permanent reinvestment (PwC 2018).  
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(CTJ 2012, CTJ 2016). Under current accounting standards wide variation exists among 
companies in the reporting of PRE. In the majority of situations, this results in significant 
information asymmetry between corporations and investors about the potential income 
tax expense related to PRE. This is evidenced by the fact that while over 60 percent of 
Fortune 500 companies had PRE offshore at the end of 2015, only 27 (less than 10 
percent) of these companies disclose (in the income tax footnote) the amount of U.S. tax 
they would pay if they repatriated the earnings (CTJ 2016). This is problematic because 
when corporations deem the potential deferred tax liability estimate to be impracticable 
(and do not disclose any amount as a future potential tax liability), and later change their 
assumptions about permanent reinvestment, a previously off-balance sheet (and 
undisclosed) liability must be currently recognized. Making this previously unknown 
liability a reality could result in significant income tax expense consequences that are 
difficult for nonprofessional investors to anticipate.  
To investigate the effect of disclosure transparency on nonprofessional investors’ 
judgments, I conduct a 3x3 between-participants experiment. In period one of the 
experiment, participants receive one of three possible disclosures related to PRE and its 
tax implications. One disclosure includes an amount for PRE with no related potential tax 
liability (the disclosure that has been predominately used), another disclosure includes an 
amount for PRE with an additional disclosure about foreign cash and cash equivalents 
(the current FASB proposed disclosure), and the final disclosure includes an amount for 
PRE and a related potential tax liability range (an alternative disclosure that has been 
considered by FASB). After receiving the disclosure, participants make attractiveness 
assessments and future tax liability likelihood assessments.  
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In period two of the experiment, participants see one of three possible year two 
scenarios. In one scenario, management assertions regarding permanent reinvestment of 
foreign earnings do not change and repatriation does not occur. In a second scenario, 
management assertions regarding permanent reinvestment of foreign earnings change as a 
result of an unanticipated cash need and repatriation occurs with a resulting tax liability. 
In a third scenario, management assertions regarding permanent reinvestment of foreign 
earnings change as a result of a predictable cash need and repatriation occurs with a 
resulting tax liability. Participants again make investment attractiveness assessments and 
also indicate whether or not they feel misled by the period one disclosure they received. 
I predict that nonprofessional investors will fixate on the disclosure of a potential 
liability and infer that a liability exists, even though as long as the foreign income is 
permanently reinvested no future tax liability exists. Consequently, there will be a 
difference in tax liability likelihood assessments and level of investment attractiveness 
assessments, with those who receive a disclosure containing a dollar amount indicating 
higher tax liability likelihood assessments and lower investment attractiveness 
assessments. My predictions are based on theory that suggests since individuals are 
biased in favor of that to which they are exposed (e.g., Brenner et al. 1996, Slovic 1972), 
participants who receive a less transparent disclosure may not recognize the importance 
or magnitude of the information of which they are unaware and may infer that no future 
potential liability exists. On the other hand, given that nonprofessional investors often 
struggle with financial analysis (e.g., Maines and McDaniel 2000, Hodge et al. 2004), the 
increased transparency that an explicit disclosure of a potential liability contains may 
serve as an anchor that is not adjusted properly based on other relevant information (e.g., 
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that the income is PRE and thus no U.S. tax will be owed unless this designation is 
changed) in the estimation of the potential tax liability (Slovic 1972).  
However, the results of my study show that participants are not affected 
differentially by the tax footnote disclosures. Regardless of the type of disclosure 
participants receive, less than 5 percent believe that U.S. tax will ever be paid on foreign 
earnings that management asserts are permanently reinvested. Even when there is a 
disclosure indicating the dollar amount of a potential tax liability, participants appear to 
heavily rely on management’s assertion that the earnings will be permanently reinvested. 
Though it makes sense that people would not assume a liability will be due soon, 
companies can and do change their assertions, so it is very surprising that less than 5 
percent believe that repatriation will ever happen. 
I also predict that when an unexpected tax liability occurs, investors will react 
more strongly when they receive a disclosure that does not contain an estimated tax 
amount along with PRE compared to when they receive a disclosure that includes a 
specific potential tax liability. Prospect theory suggests that investors who experience a 
loss because they have not anticipated a future tax liability, will react more strongly to the 
occurrence of a tax liability (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
Further, if the resulting tax liability is a result of an event within management’s 
control, this negative reaction will be even more pronounced than when the tax liability is 
a result of something management could not reasonably anticipate. Though attribution 
theory indicates that individuals are held responsible for negative outcomes (e.g., Shaw 
and Sulzer 1964), when an individual provides an external justification for an action that 
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damages an observer, observers are less frustrated by the action than if no external 
justification is given (Kelley and Michela 1980).  
My results are mixed in that when an unanticipated tax liability arises, the 
transparency of the footnote disclosure does not affect nonprofessional investors’ feelings 
of being misled. Given my results for the footnote disclosure conditions alone, this result 
is not surprising. However, participants do feel misled if management repatriates foreign 
earnings when it asserted that it would not. Additionally, if management should have 
been able to foresee a need for the repatriation, participants feel even more misled. These 
feelings lead to decreases in investment attractiveness judgments. Taken as a whole, my 
results demonstrate the importance of management assertions in financial reporting: 
investors must be able to appropriately rely on the information provided in disclosures, 
because without transparent disclosures of management’s true intentions investors feel 
misled.  
The results of this study contribute to theory and practice. First, this study extends 
the stream of financial accounting literature concerned with the effects of accounting 
disclosure placement on how the disclosure’s information is used and interpreted (See 
Libby et al. 2002 and Libby and Emett 2014 for a discussion of this literature). Prior 
studies have focused on the weight (Maines and McDaniel 2000), the classification 
(Hopkins 1996), and the acquisition and integration (Hodge et al. 2004) of disclosed 
information based on the placement of the information. This study extends that literature 
by considering the use and interpretation of a disclosure that requires subjective and 
complex calculations and may or may not be specifically disclosed depending on 
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management’s assertions. Leases, fair value, and contingent liability disclosures are just a 
few examples of complex accounting disclosures to which this study may apply.  
Second, this study provides further insight into one of the most complex financial 
statement disclosures: the tax footnote. Tax disclosures are important to investors since 
income taxes make up a large portion of the expense a corporation incurs. Additionally, 
the financial statements are usually the sole source of information investors can access 
about a corporation’s tax situation (Graham et al. 2012), and currently the information 
needed to estimate the tax ramifications of PRE is often scattered throughout the financial 
statements. Taxes also likely intimidate nonprofessional investors because these investors 
often lack specific tax knowledge. Given all of these factors, understanding how tax 
disclosures affect investors in determining a corporation’s financial position is vital.  
Finally, this study provides valuable information to regulators who specifically 
identify nonprofessional investors as an important stakeholder in the financial reporting 
process. My results indicate that investors rely on the qualitative information provided in 
footnotes (i.e., management assertions) rather than the quantitative information provided 
(i.e., explicit economic values). As regulators seek to implement useful guidance, this 
information could help them design their rules to best meet the needs of the 
nonprofessional investor stakeholder group. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides background and hypothesis 
development, Section III describes the experiment, Section IV explains the results, and 




BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background about Permanently Reinvested Earnings  
Under the rules in effect when this study was conducted, the United States 
corporate income tax system is a worldwide system, meaning U.S. companies are taxed 
on worldwide income, without regard to where the income is earned. However, the tax 
law allows corporations to defer the payment of U.S. income tax on earnings of foreign 
subsidiaries until those earnings are repatriated (in the form of dividends) to their U.S. 
parent. Therefore, U.S. corporations avoid current U.S. taxation by reinvesting foreign 
earnings in foreign jurisdictions. Foreign jurisdictions may subject the income to current 
taxation, and when foreign taxes are paid on income that is later repatriated, the U.S. 
allows a tax credit for income taxes already paid on the foreign income. Given that the 
U.S. had the world’s third highest corporate tax rate, and the highest of all Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and major trading 
partners, foreign taxes were almost always less than U.S. taxes (Pomerleau 2015). Under 
ASC 740, a deferred tax liability should be recorded in the period foreign income is 
earned to account for the future income taxes owed on reinvested foreign earnings. 
However, if foreign earnings are deemed to be permanently reinvested in the foreign 
jurisdiction, no deferred tax liability must be recorded (ASC 740-30-25-17, previously 
known as APB 23). An estimate of the unrecognized deferred tax liability is required to 
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be disclosed in the income tax footnote, unless an estimate is “not practicable.” In 
practice, few companies disclose an estimate of the unrecognized deferred tax liability. 
The lack of disclosure is especially problematic because earnings designated as 
PRE can, and are, easily undesignated as permanently reinvested. For example, 
Usvyatsky and McKeon (2016) highlight that several large companies reported decreases 
in PRE from 2014 to 2015.4 They investigate several of these companies and find no 
common reason for the decreases. Each company made the change in assertion about 
permanent reinvestment based on its specific business needs, for example, the desire to 
buy back stock or pay a dividend.5 GE Capital made headlines in 2015 for its unexpected 
change in assertions about permanent reinvestment. When GE Capital was sold, General 
Electric decided to repatriate the subsidiary’s $36 billion in PRE. This resulted in an 
unexpected accrual of income tax expense of $3.548 billion (GE 2015, Gelles and de la 
Mercad 2015). This was a surprise for investors as General Electric’s 2014 annual report 
did not disclose an amount for any potential unrecognized taxes on PRE (GE 2014).  
Regulatory changes could also influence management’s assertions about 
permanent reinvestment. When the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provided for 
repatriation of foreign earnings at a reduced rate (5.25 percent compared to 35 percent), 
firms repatriated $299 billion of foreign earnings (not necessarily all PRE) to receive 
favorable tax treatment (Norris 2009). As Fleischer (2012) notes, many companies are 
                                                          
4 The five largest companies to have decreases are General Electric Co, Baxter International Inc., Noble 
Energy Inc., Murphy Oil Corp., and Keysight Technologies, Inc. These companies saw decreases of 
between 3.1 and 15 billion dollars in PRE over the course of a year. 
5 A change in assertion in this context is a change in management’s claim about the permanent 
reinvestment of foreign earnings. Some of the other reasons for the change in management’s assertions 
include: more favorable tax consequences than when the PRE were first designated as PRE due to the 
foreign currency weakening against the U.S. dollar resulting in a higher foreign tax credit, repayment of a 
note receivable from a foreign subsidiary, and repatriation due to U.S. cash needs from mergers and 
acquisitions (Usvyatsky and McKeon 2016). 
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now keeping cash overseas waiting for another tax holiday, while simultaneously 
claiming for financial reporting purposes that this cash will be permanently reinvested. 
He quotes an Ernst and Young adviser as saying “An assertion of indefinite or permanent 
investment until Congress changes that law allowing cheaper repatriation again doesn’t 
sound permanent” (Fleischer 2012, pg. 3).6 
The financial reporting of PRE has come under increased scrutiny from 
accounting standard setters as a result of the surge in its growth. Recent Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters have stressed the importance of 
corporations providing “accurate, transparent, and plain-English disclosures of significant 
assertions and estimates, including those associated with undistributed foreign earnings” 
(Abahoonie and Barbut 2012, pg. 2). With increasingly large amounts of income 
generated overseas, the tax implications of these earnings may materially affect the 
financial statements, and investor decisions.7 Additionally, the SEC has noted the 10-K 
should be consistent in its treatment of PRE. For example, the SEC has criticized the 
practice of corporations disclosing that no potential tax liability exists because foreign 
earnings are permanently reinvested, while simultaneously identifying these earnings as 
available in the U.S. for liquidity and capital resource purposes (Abahoonie and Barbut 
2012). See Exhibit A for examples of SEC comment letters about this practice. Current 
accounting standards do not prevent this inconsistent treatment of PRE. Based, in part, on 
                                                          
6 With the passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, a tax (toll charge) of 15.5% on reinvested earnings 
in the form of cash and cash equivalents and an 8% tax on the remaining reinvested earnings will be 
assessed in lieu of the federal income tax that would otherwise be due upon repatriation at the former 
corporate rate of 35%. 
7 In addition to the disclosure of PRE, some might be concerned about the foregone tax revenue related to 
these earnings. This is a separate issue and not the focus of the current paper. 
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SEC comment letters, FASB is addressing PRE in its proposed accounting standards 
update (ASU) on the disclosure of income taxes (FASB 2016a).  
FASB states that its purpose in the overall disclosure framework project is to, 
“improve the effectiveness of disclosures required by GAAP in the notes to the financial 
statements by facilitating clear communication of information that is most important to 
financial statement users” (FASB 2016a, pg. 1). In regards to income taxes specifically, 
the Post-Implementation Review (PIR) of Statement 109 (now codified as ASC 740) 
indicates users may not have the detail necessary to determine the tax effects related to 
earnings that may possibly be repatriated to the U.S. parent company (FASB 2016a). 
Users themselves provided feedback to FASB (in the form of comment letters) 
indicating that removing the practicability exception of ASC 740-30-50-2 would be the 
most helpful change to allow for the analysis of PRE. Removing this exception would 
require firms to disclose a dollar amount of the potential deferred tax liability. See 
Exhibit B for an example of a disclosure with the practicability exception and the same 
disclosure without the practicability exception. However, to date FASB is unwilling to 
remove this exception because of cost and complexity concerns that have existed since 
the original rule was enacted (FASB 2016a).  
For example, there is uncertainty about future tax rates when repatriation would 
potentially occur and the method of repatriation of funds. There is also complexity 
associated with calculating U.S. foreign tax credits (Abahoonie and Barbut 2012). The 
more complexity and uncertainty present in the calculations, the more resources 
companies must expend to determine an accurate disclosure. FASB did consider a 
disclosure based on a simplified calculation of the deferred tax liability that assumed the 
 
12 
foreign earnings would be remitted to the U.S. under currently enacted tax law. However, 
several board members did not think that this calculation would be representative of the 
amount and timing of future cash flows, and therefore FASB did not consider this 
proposal further (FASB 2016a).  
Instead, the proposed FASB disclosure modifies the current disclosure to also 
require the disclosure of foreign cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities. FASB 
believes that this addition will assist users in understanding how much of the 
unrepatriated foreign earnings are liquid and available for repatriation (FASB 2016a). It 
is unclear how users will interpret this information, especially in situations where there 
are more liquid assets than unrepatriated foreign earnings. For example when users are 
told there is $100 million of unrepatriated earnings and $200 million of liquid assets, will 
they understand that all the earnings can be repatriated or will they just be confused about 
why they are given this information?8  
Hypotheses 
Financial statement analysis requires conscious cognitive processing on the part 
of investors. Since conscious cognitive processing occurs in working memory, which can 
only handle a limited amount of information (Pass et al. 2003), investors who are 
inexperienced and do not have knowledge structures related to financial analysis may 
have difficulty making accurate investment judgments. The accounting literature has 
recognized for some time that attention and memory are factors that influence the 
                                                          
8 Since it is unclear how the addition of this information will help users understand the tax situation of the 
company, I do not predict that the additional disclosure of cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities 
will impact user judgments. In the discussion of my hypotheses, I consider the current disclosure to be 
similar to the proposed disclosure in that neither of them has a disclosure of a potential tax liability and do 
not make specific predictions about how these two conditions differ. 
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information processing of accounting information (e.g., Birnberg and Shields 1984), yet 
few studies have considered how simplifying the integration of information may affect 
nonprofessional investor judgments.  
Prior research has made it clear that nonprofessional investors lack financial 
analysis skills. Maines and McDaniel (2000) indicate that nonprofessional investors’ lack 
of accounting and finance knowledge generally leads to poorly defined decision models 
and unstructured information assimilation procedures when experiencing the high 
cognitive burden of making investment judgments. Additionally, Hodge et al. (2004) 
demonstrate that a sequential, rather than a directive, search process characterizes the 
behavior of less experienced investors who do not understand the relations among 
financial statements. As a result, less experienced investors are less accurate in their 
investment judgments (Hodge et al. 2004).  
Simplifying information integration through increased transparency may appear to 
be the solution to the cognitive difficulties that nonprofessional investors face. Prior 
research has shown that individuals are biased in favor of that to which they are exposed 
(e.g., Brenner et al. 1996, Slovic 1972). People tend only to use information that is given 
to them, and only in the form it is given to them (Slovic 1972). Brenner et al. (1996) take 
this one step further by showing that even when people know they have incomplete 
information, they do not sufficiently compensate for that lack of information. A potential 
accounting-related consequence of these cognitive limitations is that individuals are 
insufficiently concerned about off-balance sheet liabilities (Hirschliefer and Teoh 2003). 
Thus, without increasing transparency investors may not recognize the importance or 
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magnitude of missing information even though it is obvious they do not have all of the 
information needed to understand the implications of a footnote disclosure.  
The estimated tax liability related to PRE is an example of an off-balance sheet 
contingent liability in that when a corporation elects to use the practicability exception, 
there is a potential liability that has not been disclosed on the financial statements, but 
could exist in the future. As the current disclosure of potential taxes on PRE does not 
require any specific amount to be disclosed, investors are required to use additional 
cognitive resources to locate and integrate information from various places in the 
financial statements to assist them in determining their own estimate of taxes on PRE 
should repatriation occur. Bauman and Shaw (2008) estimated taxes on PRE from 
financial statement information for corporations that had actually disclosed the estimate 
in their tax footnote. When they compared their estimates to the actual disclosure of the 
potential tax liability the authors’ estimates were significantly lower than what the 
corporations actually disclosed. This suggests that without management’s disclosure, it is 
difficult to accurately predict the amount of the potential tax liability. Consequently, on 
its face, increasing the transparency of the tax disclosure of PRE by disclosing a specific 
potential tax amount could improve investors’ ability to understand the tax implications 
of PRE as it requires less effort and is more precise than any calculation an investor could 
perform himself.  
However, increased transparency may also have an unintended effect. It is 
possible that providing additional information about a complex disclosure leads 
individuals to misinterpret the disclosure. For the same reasons that individuals may 
inappropriately rely on incomplete information, they may also rely on information that is 
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explicitly displayed, without understanding the implications of the information (Slovic 
1972). Increased transparency provides information that, because of nonprofessional 
investors’ cognitive challenges in making investing judgments, will likely serve as an 
anchor that is not adjusted for properly, based on other relevant information (Slovic 
1972). 
None of the potential PRE disclosures indicate a tax liability exists; however, 
nonprofessional investors are likely to read the disclosure without consideration of the 
overall information content the disclosure is conveying; instead focusing on the 
disclosure of a specific tax amount and inferring that a liability exists. This leads to the 
first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Nonprofessional investors will assess a higher liability likelihood when they 
receive a disclosure containing a potential liability amount compared to a 
disclosure without a potential liability amount, and consequently, they will make 
lower investment attractiveness assessments. 
 
 The preceding hypothesis indicates a potential unintended effect of increased 
disclosure transparency based on the cognitive processing challenges nonprofessional 
investors face. However, without increased transparency about the tax implications of 
PRE, investors may experience a negative emotional reaction and feel misled if, as a 
result of changes in management’s assertions, an unanticipated tax liability arises in the 
future. For example, management may intend to permanently reinvest foreign earnings 
when the disclosure is made, but later may have a need to repatriate cash creating an 
immediate tax due. Based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and 
attribution theory (see Kelley and Michela 1980 for a review of this literature), I make 
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predictions regarding nonprofessional investors’ reactions to the existence of an 
unexpected tax liability.  
 Similar to prior research on investor reactions to earnings surprises (e.g., Pinello 
2008), I predict based on prospect theory that investors will experience a loss because 
they have not anticipated a future tax liability and therefore, will react more strongly to 
the occurrence of a tax liability. The strength of the reaction will be related to the 
disclosure received and the reason for the tax liability. When no disclosure of a potential 
tax liability is given to the investor, a stronger negative reaction to the loss will likely 
result as investors will feel more misled at the occurrence of an unanticipated liability. 
Predicated on attribution theory, the degree to which investors feel misled will be a result 
of whether the reason for the unexpected liability was within management’s control or 
outside management’s control.  
When investors receive a disclosure of PRE and evaluate the income tax 
implications of the disclosure they will develop a reference point corresponding to their 
estimate of the tax that will be due in the future. Prospect theory suggests individuals 
evaluate outcomes based on changes in their welfare in relation to reference points 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Based on the preceding hypothesis, it follows that certain 
reference points are more likely to exist depending on the disclosure received. For an 
investor who receives a disclosure that does not contain a potential tax liability amount, it 
is more likely that s/he has a reference point of zero than an investor who receives a 
disclosure that does contain a potential tax liability amount. The future actions of 
management (i.e., whether they repatriate any PRE or not) will determine whether 
investors view the tax related outcomes of those actions as gains, losses, or neutral. If a 
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tax liability arises in the future, investors who had a reference point of zero (most likely 
those who did not receive a disclosure with a potential tax liability) will experience the 
strongest feelings of loss. 
 In addition to the magnitude of the loss, the strength of investor reactions will be 
influenced by the reason for the unanticipated income tax liability. Attribution theory 
suggests that responsibility for outcomes can be placed on both individual (e.g., a moral 
choice) and environmental (e.g., a stock market crash) factors (Kelley and Michela 1980). 
Responsibility attributions vary based on the outcome of the situation, the environmental 
pressures in the situation, and whether external justification is provided for the action. 
Shaw and Sulzer (1964) demonstrate when negative outcomes occur, there is greater 
attribution of responsibility to the individual rather than the external environment; 
however, higher environmental pressures reduce individual responsibility attributions. 
Additionally, when environmental pressures are high, observers who witness behaviors 
inconsistent with their expectations of appropriate behavior attribute the behavior to 
environmental factors. When environmental pressures are low, observers attribute the 
inconsistent behavior to individual traits (Trope 1974). Finally, Kelley and Michela 
(1980) conclude based on several of their reviewed studies, when an individual provides 
an external justification for an action that damages an observer, observers are less 
frustrated by the action than if no external justification is given. Therefore, differences in 
attribution are likely to be made by nonprofessional investors when an unanticipated tax 
liability arises based upon the reason for the liability.  
When management voluntarily changes an assertion and the event prompting the 
change was foreseeable, nonprofessional investors are likely to assign greater 
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responsibility to management and feel more misled by management than when 
environmental factors outside of management’s control result in the change in assertion 
and cause the liability. This prediction is also supported by Brown and Solomon (1987) 
which demonstrates that evaluations of managerial decisions when failure occurs are 
harsher when the manager should have anticipated the outcome. The previous discussion 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
H2a: When an unanticipated liability arises, nonprofessional investors will have 
greater feelings of being misled when the financial disclosure they receive has not 
previously contained a potential liability amount compared to when the disclosure 
has contained a potential liability amount. 
 
H2b: When the reason for the unanticipated liability could have been reasonably 
anticipated by management, nonprofessional investors will have greater feelings 
of being misled than when the reason could not have been reasonably anticipated. 
 
H2c: Greater feelings of being misled on the part of nonprofessional investors 








Participants are nonprofessional investors recruited from the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) platform. In order to qualify for the study, participants passed screening 
questions indicating they are over 18, they have prior investment experience, they have 
taken at least one accounting or finance course, they have at least some college 
experience, and they have never worked as an investment professional. Also, participants 
are located in the U.S., have completed at least 500 HITs in AMT, and have a 95 percent 
rating on AMT. In total, six hundred forty-two participants passed the initial screening 
criteria and are eligible to complete the study. Additionally, there is a short background 
section with an associated knowledge quiz participants must pass to demonstrate they 
have a basic understanding of financial accounting and repatriation of foreign earnings. 
One hundred eighty-nine people failed this quiz, and thus did not proceed to the study, 
reducing my total participants to four hundred fifty-three.9 Online workers seem suited to 
this task as they are honest, expend the same or more effort than other commonly used 
                                                          
9 Questions similar to the screening questions were also asked at the end of the study and compared to the 
responses from the screening questions to verify that participants met the requirements of the study. If 
participants were simply answering the screening questions the way they thought they should to qualify for 
the study, but did not actually qualify, this method should identify those who were dishonest. Given that 
most individuals would not remember the screening questions by the end of the study, they should answer 
the demographic questions honestly. Though several participants gave conflicting responses about their 
age, since all participants were over 18, I did not remove any participants on the basis of an age 
discrepancy. However, four participants indicated they were investment professionals in the demographic 
questions and twelve had not taken at least one finance or accounting course. Analyses only include the 437 
participants that answered consistently. Results including all 453 participants are not qualitatively different. 
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participants (i.e., students), and are reasonably educated and financially literate (Farrell et 
al. 2017). Participants receive a base payment of $1.50 and earn an additional $1 if they 
answer all three multiple-choice manipulation check questions correctly. Thirty-nine 
percent of participants earn the $2.50. 
The average participant in the study is 38 years old, has a Bachelor’s degree, 
makes between $50,000 and $75,000, and has taken 2.85 and 2.0 courses in accounting 
and finance, respectively. Participants have invested on average 52.17 times on their own 
behalf and 2.62 on behalf of others.10 These and other demographic variables are 
tabulated in Table 3.1.  
Design and Manipulations 
Participants make judgments about the tax implications of PRE at a hypothetical 
company. The company is a mid-sized, publicly traded electronic device and software 
manufacturer and developer. I test my hypotheses with a 3x3 between-participant 
experiment. I manipulate disclosure type by presenting participants with three possible 
income tax disclosures of PRE based on the FASB’s discussions regarding changes to the 
disclosure. The disclosure type is either the current income tax footnote disclosure related 
to PRE (CURRENT), the proposed FASB disclosure (PROPOSED), or an alternative 
disclosure that has elements the FASB has considered previously (ALTERNATIVE). See 
Appendix A for an excerpt of the instrument containing the experimental manipulations.  
                                                          
10 Analyzing demographic items related to experience investing for oneself or others, number of accounting 
and finance courses, gender, age, education level, current work status, and current yearly household income 
shows that there are no significant differences across conditions. Participants’ responses to their familiarity 
with the Trump tax proposal, confidence in evaluating investments, frequency of financial information 
analysis, frequency of financial information analysis regarding taxes, and familiarity with the tax 
implications of permanently reinvested earnings were also considered as potential covariates and none are 
significantly different across conditions. When participants were asked whether they had ever evaluated 
financial statements, there was a significant difference across conditions (p=.034), but including this item 
as a covariate does not change the results of the hypotheses testing. 
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The CURRENT disclosure contains a statement that the amount of the deferred 
tax liability for PRE is impracticable to calculate, as this is the predominant disclosure 
used in practice (CTJ 2016).11 The PROPOSED disclosure modifies the CURRENT 
disclosure by including changes FASB has proposed as part of the new disclosure 
framework (as of September 2016). These changes require the disclosure of cash and 
cash equivalents of funds held outside the United States, and align with the major SEC-
advocated disclosure changes (Molina 2013).12 The ALTERNATIVE disclosure modifies 
the PROPOSED disclosure by including a range of the potential tax liability associated 
with PRE. The motivation for this condition is based on the desire users have for 
removing the practicability exception of ASC 740-30-25-17 and the FASB’s initial 
consideration of proposing a disclosure based on a simplified calculation of the deferred 
tax liability that was not pursued further (FASB 2016a). I chose a range disclosure based 
on Kennedy et al. (1998) who show that a range disclosure prevents financial statement 
users from anchoring on a point estimate in a contingent liability situation. Though 
participants in Kennedy et al. (1998) did still try to find an anchor at the mid-point of the 
range, including a range for the contingent liability of taxes on PRE should help users 
understand there is uncertainty in the calculation and highlights the contingent nature of 
the liability.  
                                                          
11 While I label this condition CURRENT, I note here that companies are required to disclose a potential 
tax point estimate unless they make this assertion. 
12 Foreign earnings can be held in the form of any asset in the foreign jurisdiction. This modified disclosure 
provides users with an understanding of what earnings are in liquid assets and thus could reasonably be 
repatriated. If the foreign earnings are reinvested in property, plant, and equipment for example, they are 
unavailable for repatriation. Currently, users only see the total amount of earnings deemed permanently 
reinvested. See Blouin et al. (2014) for details about how companies reinvest their PRE. Additionally, 
under the proposed standards, corporations must report changes in assertions about PRE in the tax 
disclosure. This is not applicable in period one of my study. 
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I also manipulate the existence of an actual tax liability, varied at three levels and 
only applicable in the second period of the experiment. The existence of a tax liability is 
manipulated as either no tax liability (NONE), tax liability from a foreseeable change in 
management’s assertions (ANTICIPATED), or tax liability from an unforeseeable change 
in management’s assertions (UNANTICIPATED). The NONE condition reflects no 
change in management assertions and looks similar to the prior year. The 
ANTICIPATED condition reflects a change in management assertions in that 
management decided to repatriate previously designated PRE because the company needs 
to make the final payment on a 2012 acquisition. Participants are told that management 
was aware of the terms of the contract, but did not set aside funds for the payment, 
resulting in a $5 billion tax liability. In the UNANTICIPATED condition, a $5 billion tax 
liability has resulted as a consequence of repatriation for an acquisition that was made in 
the current year. Management assertions changed due to an event that was not foreseeable 
at the end of the previous year when they were deemed permanently reinvested. 
Task and Procedure 
 After reading background information about the company and its foreign 
operations, participants are given a tax disclosure of PRE. They see either the 
CURRENT, PROPOSED, or ALTERNATIVE disclosure, depending on the condition to 
which they are assigned. The case materials do not contain the entire income tax footnote, 
but instead only contain an excerpt from the income tax footnote related to the company’s 
PRE. The excerpt is a modified version of Apple, Inc.’s disclosure of its PRE. After 
reading the disclosure, participants indicate how attractive the company is as an 
investment as well as whether they believe a tax liability will ever exist. If they believe a 
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liability will exist, they indicate an estimate of the U.S. taxes that will be paid and how 
likely it is that the company will repatriate some of its earnings that it has designated as 
permanently reinvested. All participants then experience a second period. Participants are 
told to imagine that a year has gone by and they are given another year of financial 
information and a new disclosure. Participants either find out the company had not 
changed its assertions or participants find out that a tax liability was incurred due to 
either a foreseeable or unforeseeable change in management’s assertions. After receiving 
the period two information, participants again assess investment attractiveness and 
provide their perceptions of being misled. Finally, participants respond to a post-
experimental questionnaire, including manipulation checks. The task took approximately 
24 minutes for participants to complete. 
Dependent Variables 
There are two primary dependent variables in period one of the experiment. The 
first is participants’ investment attractiveness assessments. The second primary 
dependent variable is participants’ likelihood assessments about whether a tax liability 
exists related to the company’s PRE. Participants first assess the investment 
attractiveness to prevent their likelihood assessments from influencing their 
attractiveness assessments. Participants also estimate the company’s potential tax liability 
on PRE and how likely it is that the company will repatriate some of its PRE.13  
                                                          
13 I predict that participants in the CURRENT and PROPOSED conditions will have a low estimate of the 
company’s potential tax liability. However, it is possible without any estimate from management that 
participants will estimate a tax liability using their knowledge of the corporate tax rate of 35 percent. This 
will always overestimate the potential tax liability since it does not take into account any foreign tax credit 
that the U.S. provides for income taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions. If participants in the CURRENT and 




In period two of the experiment, there are also two primary dependent variables. The first 
is participants’ period two investment attractiveness assessment. Prior to making the 
period two investment attractiveness assessment, participants are reminded of their period 
one judgments.14 The second is participants’ perceptions regarding how misled they felt 
as a result of the existence of a tax liability in period two. The response scale for feelings 
of being misled is adapted from a scale used in the marketing literature (Newell et al. 
1998).15   
                                                          
14 Participants are reminded of their period one judgments because they would otherwise be required to 
perfectly recall their initial judgments after distraction by the period two information or be impacted by 
recall error. To avoid error, I provide assistance in the form of a reminder of their initial judgments. Prior 
research (e.g., Arunachalam and Beck 2002) has also used reminders of prior period judgments before 
participants make a current judgment. 
15 Newell et al. (1998) refer to their scale as a measure of deception. However, only one item contains the 
word deception and overall the items capture participants’ feelings about how misled they feel. The items 
are displayed in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.1 Demographic Information 
     Mean  Median   SD   n 
 
Number of times invested  52.17  10.00  146.10  437 
for self 
 
Number of times invested  2.62  0.00  14.68  437 
for others 
 
Confidence in investment  59.59  63.00  21.22  437 
ability 
 
Familiarity with PRE   32.57  28.00  27.04  437 
 
How often evaluate financial  40.81  35.00  27.09  437 
information 
 
How often evaluate corporate  22.72  15.00  22.81  437 
taxes 
 
Familiarity with Trump tax plan 32.62  29.00  26.50  437 
 
Accounting classes taken  2.85  2.00  3.62  437 
 
Finance classes taken   2.00  1.00  2.40  437 
 
Education (% bachelor’s or higher)   80.1%      437 
 
Employment status (% full-time)      79.9%      437 
 
Income (% below 100k)            77.3%      437 
 
Gender (% Female)    36%      436 
 
Age     37.96  35.00  10.97  437 
 
Notes:   
Confidence is reported on a 0-100 scale with 100 representing very confident and 0 representing not at all 
confident.  
 
Familiarity questions are reported on a 0-100 scale with 100 representing very familiar and 0 representing 
not familiar at all. 
 
Frequency of evaluating financial and tax information questions are reported on a 0-100 scale with 100 







Participants respond to three manipulation check items to see whether they can 
correctly identify the condition to which they are assigned. First, participants are asked 
whether the case materials contained a range of the unrecognized potential tax liability in 
the tax footnote. Sixty-eight percent of participants answered this question correctly. 
Second, participants are asked whether the tax footnote contained an amount for cash, 
cash equivalents and marketable securities. Sixty-three percent of participants answered 
this question correctly. Forty-four percent passed both manipulation check items related 
to the footnote condition to which they were assigned. While this is a low pass rate, 
removing those who failed one of the first two manipulation check questions does not 
qualitatively alter the results of the footnote effects demonstrated in the hypothesis testing 
below. Third, participants are asked whether LDN, Corp. was paid a dividend from a 
foreign subsidiary. Eighty-two percent of participants answered this question correctly. 
Finally, participants who respond “yes” to the third manipulation check item are asked 
whether management could have anticipated the reason for the dividend prior to 2017 or 
not, on a scale of 0-100, where 0=Definitely could not have anticipated and 
100=Definitely could have anticipated. There is a significant difference between those in 
the ANTICIPATED (mean of 75.50) and UNANTICIPATED (mean of 59.71) conditions 
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(p < 0.001), indicating the manipulation was successful.16 My analyses include all 
participants.  
Tests of H1 
H1 predicts that nonprofessional investors will have higher likelihood assessments 
of a tax liability and lower investment attractiveness assessments when they receive a 
disclosure that contains a potential tax liability amount compared to when the disclosure 
makes no specific mention of a tax liability amount. To test H1, I first conduct a chi-
square test to determine if there is a difference across disclosure conditions between those 
who believe LDN, Corp. would ever pay U.S. tax on its permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings and those who do not. As shown in Table 4.1, Panel A, there is no difference in 
likelihood assessments between footnote conditions (p = 0.45). Since only 20 participants 
out of 437 believe a liability would ever exist, no test of a specific likelihood is 
conducted.  
Next, I conduct an ANOVA with investment attractiveness judgments as the 
dependent variable and disclosure type as the independent variable. Table 4.1, Panel B 
shows there is not a significant difference in investment attractiveness judgments across 
disclosure type (p = 0.46). I further evaluate planned contrasts between each disclosure 
type and find no significant differences for any contrasts (smallest p = 0.35). Only the 
contrast directly related to H1 is tabulated in Table 4.1, Panel C. One explanation for 
these results may be that it was difficult for participants to understand the footnote 
because of the complexity of the financial information presented. I asked participants 
“How easy was the information in the income tax footnote to understand regarding the 
                                                          
16 All p-values are one-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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tax implications of the company’s permanently reinvested foreign earnings?” on a scale 
from 0-100, with 0=very difficult to understand and 100=very easy to understand. There 
were no differences across conditions and the average response was 75.29. Thus, 
participants believe they understand the footnote; however, the results suggest they focus 
on management assertions rather than the range of the potential tax liability. I also 
perform the tests of H1 including only those who passed both manipulation check 
questions regarding their assigned footnote condition. The results are qualitatively similar 
to the results in Table 4.1, suggesting that even for participants who are sure about what 
condition they are in, the explicit disclosure of an economic value does not have a 
significant effect on their judgments. Therefore, H1 is not supported. Participants appear 
to focus on management’s assertions rather than the possibility of a future tax liability, 
even when presented with a footnote that includes a range disclosure. 
Tests of H2 
Though I acknowledge that when repatriation occurs participants, regardless of 
condition, may feel misled and revise their investment attractiveness assessments 
downward, H2a, in conjunction with H2c, predicts this effect will be larger when 
nonprofessional investors do not receive a disclosure that contains a potential tax liability 
amount in period one. H2b, in conjunction with H2c, predicts this effect will also be 
greater when the reason the tax liability arose should have been anticipated by 
management. Therefore, participants in the ANTICIPATED and CURRENT or 
PROPOSED conditions are predicted to have the greatest feelings of being misled and the 
greatest decreases in investment attractiveness assessments. Descriptive statistics for the 
feelings of being misled and changes in attractiveness by condition are presented in Table 
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4.2, Panels A&B, while the items asked to capture feelings of being misled are in 
Appendix A. 
To test H2a, I use a planned contrast to determine whether the disclosures not 
containing a tax liability led to greater feelings of being misled than the disclosure 
containing a tax liability. The contrasts are .5 for CURRENT, .5 for PROPOSED, and -1 
for ALTERNATIVE. I use the average of the responses to the six item scale adapted 
from Newell et al. (1998) for the variable, feelings of being misled.17 H2a is not 
supported as the contrast, presented in Table 4.3, Panel A, is not significant (p = 0.15).  
To test H2b, I use a planned contrast to determine whether greater feelings of 
being misled result when management could reasonably anticipate the repatriation 
compared to when management could not reasonably anticipate it. H2b is confirmed as 
seen in Table 4.3, Panel A. The contrast is significant (p < 0.001), and the mean for 
ANTICIPATED (4.14) is higher than for UNANTICIPATED (3.67), indicating that 
when repatriation could be anticipated, participants feel more misled. Though not 
specifically hypothesized, I also test how the NONE condition compared to both the 
ANTICIPATED and UNANTICIPATED conditions. Participants in the NONE condition 
felt the least misled (2.86) and this is significantly different from those in both 
repatriation conditions (both p < 0.001, untabulated). 
As a supplemental analysis to H2a and H2b which only predict the effects of 
investors’ feelings of being misled, I perform the same planned contrasts with investment 
attractiveness changes as the dependent variable in Table 4.3, Panel B. Similar to the test 
of H2a above, disclosure type is not significant to changes in investors’ attractiveness 
                                                          
17 Using all items is appropriate given that the six items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .96 and loaded on one 
factor with an eigen value of 5.014 when performing a principal component analysis.  
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assessments (p = 0.35). However, similar to the test of H2b above, the reason for 
repatriation is significantly related to changes in investors’ attractiveness assessments (p 
= 0.01), with the average for those in the ANTICIPATED conditions decreasing by 6.57, 
and the average for those in the UNANTICIPATED conditions decreasing by 2.58. 
NONE had an average increase in attractiveness of 2.44 and was significantly different 
than both ANTICIPATED and UNANTICIPATED (both p < 0.005, untabulated).  
To test H2c, I perform a regression analysis, displayed in Table 4.3, Panel C with 
changes in investment attractiveness as the dependent variable and feelings of being 
misled as the independent variable. The regression shows that greater feelings of being 
misled leads to greater decreases in attractiveness (p < 0.001; β = 0.374), confirming 
H2c.18  
Discussion 
My primary analyses demonstrate that contrary to my prediction, nonprofessional 
investors are not differentially affected by footnote disclosures with or without a potential 
tax liability disclosed. They seem to focus on management’s assertions about their 
intention to permanently reinvest their foreign earnings, and do not anchor on the 
estimated tax liability presented. The results also show that nonprofessional investors feel 
misled by management when they repatriate foreign earnings after making an assertion 
that they had no intention of doing so; this is consistent with the interpretation of the H1 
results that the participants focused on management’s period one assertion. Further, 
feelings of being misled are exacerbated if the reason management repatriated the 
                                                          
18 In both the supplemental analysis and the H2c analysis, running the analysis using investment 
attractiveness from period 2 as a dependent variable and investment attractiveness from period 1 as a 
covariate, leads to qualitatively similar results. 
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earnings was an event they could have reasonably foreseen. As a result of feeling misled, 
nonprofessional investors find the investment less attractive. Though the increased 
transparency in financial information disclosures did not affect investor judgments, when 
management assertions are not accurate, investors who receive any of the possible 
footnote disclosures react negatively.  
To shed additional light on participants’ thought processes, participants are able to 
provide a free response to the question “What additional information would have helped 
you in understanding the tax implications of LDN Corp.’s permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings?” Interestingly, responses to this question indicate a desire for management to 
give an honest assessment of their business situation, more details on the intended use of 
PRE, an industry average of how often companies repatriate PRE, the company’s history 
of repatriating PRE, and more information about the tax implications of PRE. See Table 
4.4 for a tabulation of these responses. Several of these common responses support the 
implications of this study. Nonprofessional investors want more information about 
management’s assertions beyond the standard language that they intend to permanently 
reinvest foreign earnings and it is not practical for them to estimate the tax liability. The 
SEC also wants companies to disclose more information related to their PRE. In Exhibit 
A, the excerpts from the SEC comment letters indicate that more information supporting 
management’s assertions about the permanent reinvestment in light of past actions or 
present circumstances is warranted. Changes of this nature may be more beneficial to 
investors given that they want to have information about the tax implications of PRE; 
however, as demonstrated by my study, explicit disclosures related to the economic value 
potentially involved does not affect their judgments.  
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Table 4.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
Panel A: Chi-Square Test of Likelihood Assessment 
 
 Current Proposed Alternative  Total  p< 
Yes 4.0% 4.1% 5.0% 4.3% 0.45 
No 96.0% 95.9% 95.0% 95.7%  
n 151 145 141 437  
 
Participants indicated whether LDN, Corp. would ever pay U.S. tax on its permanently 
reinvested earnings.  
 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance of Attractiveness Assessment 
 
Source df Type I SS Mean Square  F value  p< 
Footnote 2 50.28 25.14 .082 0.46 
Error 434 13,2896.55 306.21   
 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast of Attractiveness 
 
 Contrast 
Value t value p< 
Current and Proposed > Alternative -.53 .297       0.38 
 
 
Panel D: Means, <Medians>, (SD), and [n] for Attractiveness 
Current Proposed Alternative 
62.90          
<65.00>              
(16.68)              
[151] 
 
63.46        
<66.00>              
(17.50)               
[145] 
 
63.71          
<70.00>                  





The attractiveness assessment is on a 101-point scale, where 0 is very unattractive and 
100 is very attractive. 
 





Table 4.2 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Means, <Medians>, (SD), and [n] for Feelings of Being Misled By 
Condition 
 
Current Proposed Alternative 
No 
Repatriation 
2.77          
<2.58>              
(1.20)              
[52] 
 
2.99         
<2.50>              
(1.16)              
[49] 
 
2.82          
<2.50>              





4.13          
<4.58>              
(1.45)              
[48] 
 
4.11          
<4.33>              
(1.32)              
[50] 
 
4.19          
<4.17>              






3.83          
<4.00>              
(1.43)              
[51] 
 
3.79          
<3.75>              
(1.42)              
[46] 
 
3.55          
<3.50>              
(1.28)              
[49] 
 
Feelings of Being Misled is the average of participant responses to the six items 
identified in Appendix A.  
 
Panel B: Means, <Medians>, (SD), and [n] for Change in Attractiveness by 
Condition 
 
Current Proposed Alternative 
No 
Repatriation 
2.13          
<5.00>              
(13.93)              
[52] 
 
1.88          
<4.00>              
(18.95)              
[49] 
 
3.35          
<3.00>              





-7.52          
<-7.00>              
(15.53)              
[48] 
 
-5.52          
<-5.00>              
(11.23)              
[50] 
 
-6.73          
<-5.50>              






-0.98          
<0.00>              
(14.52)              
[51] 
-3.11          
<0.00>              
(15.27)              
[46] 
-4.67          
<0.00>              




Table 4.3 Hypothesis 2 
 
Panel A: Planned Contrast for H2a and b for Feelings of Being Misled 
 
 Contrast 
Value t value p< 
Current and Proposed > Alternative .15 1.030       0.15 
 
Foreseeable Repatriation > Not 
Foreseeable Repatriation .47 3.059       0.001 
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts for Supplemental Analysis for Change in Attractiveness 
 
 Contrast 
Value t value p< 
Current and Proposed > Alternative .61 .38       0.35 
 
Foreseeable Repatriation > Not 
Foreseeable Repatriation 3.99 2.216       0.014 
 
 
Panel C: Regression for H2c – Change in Attractiveness 
 
Source df SS Mean Square  F value  p< 
Feelings of Being Misled 1 14,946.20 14,946.20 70.553 0.001 









Table 4.4 Tabulation of Free Response Question 
 
Information Requested n Percentage  
Description of possible future 
repatriation events 56 27.45% 
More details regarding acquisition 42 20.59% 
How the company uses its PRE 30 14.71% 
Estimated tax upon repatriation 29 14.22% 
US tax code/law information 16 7.84% 
Foreign tax rates/information 14 6.86% 
Company repatriation history 9 4.41% 
Industry repatriation history 8 3.92% 
 
Participants responded to “What additional information would have helped you in 







This study investigates how nonprofessional investors react to increasing the 
transparency of complex financial accounting disclosures. Investors indicate that they 
value increased transparency; however, increased transparency does not lead investors to 
make different judgments. Even with increased transparency, management assertions 
appear to be much more persuasive than any potential dollar amount disclosed as a 
potential liability. Yet, without increased transparency, investors react negatively to 
circumstances they were unable to foresee as a result of the financial information left 
undisclosed.  
As with any experiment, there are limitations. First, the materials provided to the 
participants are modified to be shorter and contain only the information most relevant to 
the study. The financial statement information and tax footnote in an annual report would 
be much more detailed and provide additional information; however, due to the time 
constraints of participants, only abbreviated information is provided. Second, this study 
only examines the perceptions of nonprofessional investors. While FASB is definitely 
concerned with the behavior of nonprofessional investors, they do consider other 
stakeholders that this study does not address. Third, the context of this experiment is just 
one option among many possible complex accounting areas. Future research could 
address some of these limitations by exploring the reactions of other FASB constituents 
(such as professional investors) and investigating other complex accounting areas. 
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Testing my research question in another complex setting is expected to yield the same 
results based on management assertions driving investor judgments. 
This paper contributes to the academic literature and to on-going regulatory 
debates surrounding appropriate disclosure of financial information. This study 
contributes broadly to the accounting literature by offering insight into the complex 
relations between accounting standards and tax regulations (i.e., tax deferral of PRE) as it 
relates to financial reporting. My results also expand the disclosure literature to the 
income tax area and indicate that disclosing more detailed financial information about a 
potential tax liability does not lead nonprofessional investors to believe that a liability 
may be incurred. Instead, investors appear to be more influenced by management’s 
assertions, assertions that can and do change over time as demonstrated by Usvayatsky 
and McKeon (2016).  
These results also have direct implications for standard setters as they debate 
changes to the disclosure of income taxes. This study demonstrates that there are difficult 
tradeoffs for policymakers. Prior accounting literature offers mixed results on the benefits 
of transparency (e.g., Li 2008, Robinson and Schmidt 2013, Armstrong et al. 2015). The 
results of this study provide further insight regarding the effects of increased 
transparency. My results demonstrate that while nonprofessional investors say they value 
increased transparency, receiving a more explicit disclosure of an economic value, such 
as the range of a potential tax liability, does not impact their judgments. They anchor on 
the assertions given by management and then react strongly to changes in management 
assertions. Based on these results, standard setters should pay careful attention not only to 
the numerical items presented in disclosures of complex financial accounting areas, but 
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should also scrutinize management’s nonnumeric assertions. Future research could 
explore how to better help investors process information knowing that words speak 
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Below is selected 2016 financial information provided by the management of LDN, Corp. 
On the next screen, you will see the portion of the income tax footnote that is relevant to 







Revenue Growth 6.95% 6.50% 
Earnings Before Taxes 
(in millions) 
$53,483  $55,925 
Income Tax Expense (in 
millions) 
$13,973  $14,228 
Net Income (in millions) $39,510  $41,697 
Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) 
26.13% 25.44% 
Earnings per share (EPS) $6.49  $6.20 
Total Assets (in millions) $231,839  $225,356 
Cash, Cash Equivalents, 
and Marketable 
Securities (in millions) 
$155,239 $154,540 
Total Liabilities (in 
millions) 
$120,292  $112,750 
Total Equity (in 
millions) 





Excerpt from LDN’s Note X – Income Taxes – Information about permanently 
reinvested earnings 
As of December 31, 2016, U.S. income taxes have not been recognized on a total of 
$91.5 billion of unrepatriated foreign earnings. The Company intends to permanently 
reinvest these earnings outside the U.S. [Insert Manipulation here]. 
Manipulations 
 
Current Disclosure FASB Proposed 
Disclosure 
Alternative Disclosure 
It is not practical to 
estimate the amount of 
U.S. tax that might be 
payable on the eventual 
repatriation of these 
earnings. 
It is not practical to 
estimate the amount of U.S. 
tax that might be payable 
on the eventual 
repatriation of these 
earnings. 
As of December 31, 2016, 
$137.1 billion of the 
Company’s cash, cash 
equivalents and marketable 
securities were held by 
foreign subsidiaries. 
 
The amount of 
unrecognized deferred tax 
liability related to these 
earnings is estimated to be 
between $20.59 and $32.03 
billion. 
As of December 31, 2016, 
$137.1 billion of the 
Company’s cash, cash 
equivalents and marketable 








Thank you for looking through the case materials. Please answer the questions 
below based on the information you received in the case. If you would like, you may 
look at the case materials while on this screen by clicking on the box below. 
 
1. How attractive do you find LDN, Corp. as an investment? 
 
2. Based on the information provided to you in the case, do you believe that LDN, 
Corp. will ever pay U.S. tax on the foreign earnings it says it will permanently 




3. If so, what is your best estimate of the amount of U.S. taxes the corporation will 





4. How likely do you think it is that sometime in the future LDN, Corp. will decide to 
repatriate some of the earnings it has designated as permanently reinvested, and 
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Very 
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Assume that one year has passed and it is now the end of LDN’s 2017 fiscal year. Below 
is selected financial information from the management of LDN, Corp. for 2017. On the 
next page, you will again receive the portion of the 2017 income tax footnote that is 






Revenue Growth 7.02% 6.78% 
Earnings Before Taxes 
(in millions) 
$58,096  $63,130 
Income Tax Expense (in 
millions) 
$16,125  $18,823 
Net Income (in millions) $41,971  $44,307 
Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) 
27.76% 29.82% 
Earnings per share 
(EPS) 
$7.41  $7.06 
Total Assets (in 
millions) 
$228,369  $249,786 




Total Liabilities (in 
millions) 
$114,113  $134,912 
Total Equity (in 
millions) 






As you look at the income tax footnote, you notice that LDN Corp. has updated its 
disclosure related to permanently reinvested foreign earnings for the year to say: 
No Repatriation: 
As of December 31, 2017, U.S. income taxes have not been recognized on a total of 
$91.5 billion of unrepatriated foreign earnings. The Company intends to permanently 
reinvest these earnings outside the U.S. [Insert Manipulation here]. 
Repatriation – Management Able to Foresee Need 
 
Prior to 2017, the Company intended to permanently reinvest $91.5 billion of its foreign 
earnings. No U.S. income tax expense was recorded on these earnings.  
 
In 2012, the Company purchased NDF, Inc. Although management was aware the 
terms of the 2012 contract called for a final payment of $10.3 billion due in 2017, the 
Company did not have funds set aside for this payment. Thus, one of the Company’s 
foreign subsidiaries paid the Company a dividend of $15.3 billion of foreign earnings that 
had previously been identified as permanently reinvested. As a result, the Company 
immediately paid U.S. income taxes of $5 billion. This increased their income tax 
expense by $5 billion as well since it had not recorded a liability for this tax.  
 
The Company intends to permanently reinvest the remaining $76.2 billion of foreign 
earnings outside of the U.S. Therefore, it has not recognized U.S. income tax expense on 
these earnings. [Insert Manipulation here]. 
 
Repatriation – Management Not Able to Foresee Need 
 
Prior to 2017, the Company intended to permanently reinvest $91.5 billion of its foreign 
earnings. No U.S. income tax expense was recorded on these earnings.  
 
In 2017, the Company purchased NDF, Inc. To pay the $10.3 billion purchase price, 
one of the Company’s foreign subsidiaries paid the Company a dividend of $15.3 billion 
of foreign earnings that had previously been identified as permanently reinvested. As a 
result, the Company immediately paid U.S. income taxes of $5 billion. This increased its 
income tax expense by $5 billion as well since it had not recorded a liability for this tax.  
 
The Company intends to permanently reinvest the remaining $76.2 billion of foreign 
earnings outside of the U.S. Therefore, it has not recognized U.S. income tax expense on 







Current Disclosure FASB Proposed 
Disclosure 
Alternative Disclosure 
It is not practical to 
estimate the amount of 
U.S. tax that might be 
payable on the eventual 
repatriation of such 
earnings. 
It is not practical to 
estimate the amount of 
U.S. tax that might be 
payable on the eventual 
repatriation of such 
earnings. 
As of December 31, 2017, 
$137.1 [121.8 for 
repatriation conditions] 
billion of the Company’s 
cash, cash equivalents and 
marketable securities were 
held by foreign 
subsidiaries. 
The amount of 
unrecognized tax on these 
earnings is estimated to be 
between $20.59[15.59 for 
repatriation conditions] 
and $32.03 [27.03 for 
repatriation conditions] 
billion. 
As of December 31, 2017, 
$137.1 [121.8 for 
repatriation conditions] 
billion of the Company’s 
cash, cash equivalents and 
marketable securities were 







Please respond to the items below taking into consideration the information 
you received in part two of the case, that is, the information from the most 
recent year. You may look back, if needed, at the 2017 case materials as you 
answer the items on the screen by clicking on the box below. 
 
1. After reviewing the 2017 tax disclosure (most recent year), please indicate your 





























The 2016 tax 
disclosure was 
accurate. 
       
The 2016 tax 
disclosure was 
misleading. 
       
The 2016 tax 
disclosure was 
truthful. 
       
The 2016 tax 
disclosure was 
deceptive. 
       
The 2016 tax 
disclosure was 
factual. 
       
The 2016 tax 
disclosure was 
distorted. 
       
 
 
2. You rated the attractiveness of LDN Corp. as _____ out of 100. How would you 
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EXAMPLES OF SEC COMMENT LETTERS  
Deloitte (2015, pg. 409) provides some excerpts from SEC comment letters related to the 
disclosure of the tax consequences of PRE. 
“We note from your disclosure on page [X] that if you are required to pay the arbitration 
award, the award would be paid from one of your foreign subsidiaries using cash that is 
currently intended to be indefinitely reinvested. Please tell us whether you have accrued 
U.S. income tax on the funds that will be repatriated to pay the arbitration award. If you 
have, please clarify your disclosures in future filings. If you have not accrued taxes, 
please tell us why you do not believe it is necessary to do so considering that you believe 
it is probable that the award will be paid. See ASC 740-30-25-19.”  
 
“We note that you have significant foreign operations which resulted in tax obligations. 
In this regard, please tell us whether you hold significant cash amounts in foreign 
jurisdictions with favorable tax rates. If so, please tell us the impact that repatriating such 
amounts would have on your income taxes and results of operations, or clearly indicate 
that such amounts are permanently reinvested. In addition, please tell us whether you 
previously repatriated funds as well as whether you can meet your obligations, including 
dividend payments, with available funds, without repatriating such amounts. If meeting 
such obligations is not possible without the repatriating amounts held in jurisdictions with 
favorable tax rates, please revise to include appropriate disclosure in your dividend policy 
section, on page [X], as well as in your liquidity and capital resources discussion within 
MD&A.” 
 
“We see from pages [X] and [X] that [X%] of your revenue is generated from customers 
located outside of the United States and that deferred tax liabilities have not been 
recognized for $[X] of undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries due to your intention 
to permanently reinvest such earnings. Please revise future filings to disclose the amount 
of cash and cash equivalents as well as liquid investments held by your foreign 
subsidiaries at year end and quantify any amounts that would not be available for use in 
the U.S. without incurring U.S taxes.” 
 
“In light of the fact that your foreign subsidiary has paid significant dividends to the 
parent company in each of the last three years it is unclear how you have determined that 
all of the undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries are considered permanently 
reinvested. Please tell us and provide proposed disclosure detailing what sufficient 






EXAMPLE DISCLOSURES BASED ON APPLE, INC. 2015 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Disclosure if the company used the practicability exception: 
The Company’s consolidated financial statements provide for any related tax liability on 
undistributed earnings that the Company does not intend to be indefinitely reinvested 
outside the U.S. As of December 31, 2015, U.S. income taxes have not been provided on 
a cumulative total of $91.5 billion of such earnings. It is not practicable to estimate the 
amount of U.S. tax that might be payable on the eventual remittance of such earnings.  
 
Disclosure if the company did not use practicability exception: 
The Company’s consolidated financial statements provide for any related tax liability on 
undistributed earnings that the Company does not intend to be indefinitely reinvested 
outside the U.S. As of December 31, 2015, U.S. income taxes have not been provided on 
a cumulative total of $91.5 billion of such earnings. The amount of unrecognized 
deferred tax liability related to these temporary differences is estimated to be $30.0 
billion. 
 
 
 
